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Abstract
In [6], we introduced a means of allowing logic programs to contain negations
in both the head and the body of a clause. Such programs were called generally
Horn programs (GHPs, for short). The model-theoretic semantics of GHPs were
defined in terms of four-valued Belnap lattices [5]. For a class of programs called
well-behaved programs, an SLD-resolution like proof procedure was introduced.
This procedure was proven (under certain restrictions) to be sound (for existen-
tial queries) and complete (for ground queries). In this paper, we remove the
restriction that programs be well-behaved and extend our soundness and com-
pleteness results to apply to arbitrary existential queries and to arbitrary GHPs.
This is the strongest possible completeness result for GHPs. The results reported
llere apply to tIle design of very large knowledge bases and in processing queries
to kno\vledge bases that possibly contain erroneous information.
1 Introduction
In [6,7], we introduced a multi-valued logic for logic progranuning with clauses con-
taining negated atoms both in the head, and the body of clauses. Since such programs
Inay be inconsistent (in the classical two valued sense), any such proposal must be able
to deal "rith inconsistency in a formal and coherent manner. This was done in [6,7] via
the device of a four valued Belnap lattice.
From a pragmatic viewpoint, the proposal in [6,7] is important because it provides
a theoretical framework for developing very large knowledge bases. For example, a very
large expert system ES is typically designed by n kno\vledge engineers each of \vhom
designs a program Pi (after interacting with various "domain" experts). The normal
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procedure then, would be to take ES to be Ui:l Pi. But experts often disagree (this
is a very common occurrence in daily life), and hence the expert system ES may be
inconsistent. The fact that ES is inconsistent may not emerge until ES has already
been in use for some time; thus it is necessary to develop formal methods for reasoning
effectively in the presence of inconsistency. This point has been made independently
by Perlis[36]. The work reported in [6,7] presents a first step towards a solution to this
problem.
Subsequent to the work reported in [6], Fitting showed [14] that the logic set up by
us in [6] may be viewed as a natural generalization of I<ripke's Theory of Truth[26].
This provides an epistemological justification for the logic introduced in [6]. Fitting's
work [15,16] yields an elegant characterization of the model theory and epistemological
aspects of many-valued logic programming, but provides no proof theory. Our aim here
is to rectify the existing situation by showing how to process queries to GHPs. This task
is essentially that of mechanically showing that existentially quantified conjunctions
of atoms (i.e. "queries") are logical consequences of GHPs. The soundness and
completeness results are developed with respect to the notion of logical consequence
derived from the Belnap-style model-theoretic semantics we introduce.
Two proof procedures were given in [6]. The first was based on constructing
AND/OR trees, and it was shown to be sound and complete only for covered! GHPs
and queries whose associated ANDJOR trees were finite. The other procedure was an
SLD-resolution lil~e proof procedure called SLDnh-resolution which was proven to be
sound for existential queries to a class of GHPS called well-behaved GHPS. Complete-
ness was proved for ground queries to well-behaved GHPs.
The principal result of this paper is a modified version of SLDnh-resolution that
is sound and complete for existential queries to arbitrary GHPs. This removes all
restrictions imposed on the query processing algorithms developed in {6}. In the context
of existential query processing, this is the strongest completeness result possible.
The organization of this paper is as follows: in Section 2, we quickly derive the
main theorems and definitions of [6] in the context of programs called pseudo-GHPs.
This extends similar theorems for GHPs in a straightforward way, but, this additional
machinery needs to be set up for deriving our strong soundness and completeness
theorems. The reader interested in full proofs of these theorems will find them in [6].
In Section 3, we define the closure of a generalized Horn program, and develop a proof
procedure called SLDgh-resolution. In Section 4, we show that SLDgh-resolution is
sound and complete for processing existential queries to arbitrary GHPs. Section 5
contains a few illustrative examples.
A quick word on our philosophical views about automatic theorem proving and
non-classical logic programming is in order. Suppose L is a logic equipped with a
suitable model theory, and ,S is a sentence that is a logical consequence of a theory T
1A gh-clause is covered if all variable symbols that occur in its body also occur in its head. A GHP
is covered if all gh-clauses occurring in it are covered. The definition of gh-clause and GHP appear
later on in the paper.
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in L (i.e. S is satisfied by every model of T). \Ve are firmly of the belief tllat a "proof"
that S is a logical consequence of T must be carried out within the logic L itself This,
in our opinion, is fundamental to the notion of logic, i~e. a logic must be robust enough
to do proofs within it. In keeping with this philosphy, we tend to view methods like
those of Morgan [32,33] who translates formulas in one logic to formulas in another
logic, with deep misgivings~ Our view also appears to be shared by McRobbie and his
co-workers [43,31J.
2 (Pseudo) Generalized Horn Programs
We assume that the reader is familiar with the usual definitions of term, atom, literal,
etc. Let T = {1.., t, f, ...L} be the set of truth values of our logic. A partial ordering ~
is defined on T as for each x E T, x ~ x and ..1 ~ x ~ T. (See Fig. 1.)
Intuitively, ..1 is a truth value representing "unknown" as in !{leene's three valued
logic [25]. Similarly T is a truth value representing "both true and false" or "in-
consistent". This set of truth values is essentially the same as that of Belnap[5] and
Visser[46]~
Definition 1 If A is an atom, and J.L a truth value, then A : J.l is an annotated atom.
If J-L is one of {t, f} (resp~ {T, t, f}), then A : J.L is said to be well-annotated (resp~
definitely annotated).
Definition 2 Suppose AI, . .. , An are atoms~ and 111, . .. ,JLn are annotations in {t, fl.
Then
A o : f..lo {= Al : J.ll & ... & An : f..ln
is a generalized Horn clause if /10 E {t, f} and is a psuedo generalized Horn clause if
J-lo E {T, t, f}. (Pseudo) Generalized Horn clauses are often called (pseudo) gh-clauses
for short. All variable symbols occurring in a (pseudo) Horn clause are assumed to be
implicitly universally quantified.
Thus, pseudo gh-clauses differ from gh-clauses as their heads might be of the form
A : T. However, annotated atoms of the form B : T may not occur in the body of
either a pseudo gh-clause or an ordinary gh-clause. Note that gh-clause is a pseudo
gh-clause~
Defillitioll 3 A (pseudo) generalized Horn program is a finite set of (pseudo) gh-
clauses. A (pseudo) generalized Horn program is called a (pseudo) GHP, for short.
Intuitively, the annotated atom A : t (A : f) says that "A is true" (resp. "A is
false" ). Thus, for instance, the pseudo gh-clause
bird(X) : f -¢= donkey(.}{) : t
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says that if it is true that X is a donkey, then it is false that X is a bird.
In [6,7], we investigated the properties of GHPs - pseudo GHPs were not considered
there as it was thought to be unreasonable for programmers to write sentences of the
form: "If A l : Ill, ... ,An: fLn all hold, then Ao must be inconsistent."This is still our
point of view, and we will continue to insist that GHPs are the only programs that
programmers ought to be allowed to write. We will, however, show how to associate a
pseudo GHP with any given GHP, and then use the pseudo GHP to answer queries to
the GHP with which it is associated. This motivates the (brief) study of the declarative
semantics of pseudo GHPs. The proofs of the theorems on the declarative semantics of
pseudo GHPs are omitted as they are almost identical to the proofs of the corresponding
theorems for GHPs for which the reader may consult the already published [6]. As
usual, we will only consider Herbrand interpretations, and throughout this paper, the
words "interpretation" and "model" will be used to denote Herbrand interpretation
and Herbrand model respectively. We will consider interpretations to be mappings of
the Herbrand Base BG of the (pseudo) GHP G to the set T of truth values.
Definition 4 (Satisfaction) Let I is an interpretation and F a formula. Then IFF
iff I F (V)F. Now, for any closed (i.e. containing no freely occurring variable symbols)
formula F:
1. I l= (V)F iff I l= F' for every ground insta,nce P' of F
2. I l= (:3)F iff I l= pI for some ground instance F' of F
3. I F PI & F2 iff I F F I and I F F2
4. I l= F I V F2 iff I l= F l or I F F2
5. I l= PI ~ F2 iff I l= F1 or I ~ F2
6. I F F I ¢:} F2 iff I F PI '¢= F2 and I F F2 ¢= F I
7. I FA: fL iff fl =S I(A) where A is a ground atom
In cases (4)-(7) above, F I &F2 , F I V F 2 , F 1 {::: F2 and PI ¢:} F2 are all assumed to be
closed formulas, i.e. they contain no free occurrences of any variable.
The above definition of satisfaction tells us what the models of any pseudo GHP
G are. We now define an operator TG from Herbrand interpretations to Herbrand
interpretations as follows:
Defillition 5 Let I be any interpretation, G any pseudo GRP, and A E B G . Then
TG(I)(A) = U{fl I A : fL ¢= B 1 : fLl& ... &Bn : J-ln is a ground instance of a pseudo
gh-clause in G and I l= B1 : fLl& ... &Bn : fLn}.
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The ordering :5 on truthvalues is extended, in a pointwise fashion, to interpreta-
tions, i.e. II :5 12 iff for all A E BG , I1(A) j 12(A).
Tlleorem 1 For any pseudo GHP G, TG is continuous.
Tlleorem 2 I is a model of the pseudo GHP G iff TG (I) ~ I.
o
o
The proofs of the above theorems are very similar in spirit to the proofs of the
corresponding theorems for GHPs. The interested reader may consult [6] for the proofs.
Definition 6 The transfinite upward and downward iterations of TG are defined as:
TG T0 = ~
Ta Ta = TG(Ta T(0; - 1))
TG TA = U 71 <,\TG i 1]
TG 10 = \7
Ta 1a = TG(TG 1 (a - 1))
TG 1 A = n l1<,\TG 1 'Tf
where ~ and \7 are the interpretations that assign ...L and T respectively to all A E Ba,
Q is a successor ordinal, and A is a limit ordinal.
We use the symbol r- to denote logical consequence, i.e. if G is a pseudo GHP and
F a formula, then G r- F iff for every model M of G, it is the case that M F F. The
next theorem follows from the previous two theorems.
Tlleorem 3 Suppose G is a pseudo GHP. Then Ta i w = lfp(TG ) where lfp(Ta)
denotes the least fixed point of Ta. Moreover, for all A E Ba and all fl E T, G r- A : J1
iff Ta i w(A) ~ /1. 0
The proofs of the above theorems are very similar in spirit to the proofs of the
corresponding theorems for GHPs. The interested reader may consult [6] for the proofs.
Defillitioll 7 Suppose G is a pseudoGHP, and I a is a model of G. I is said to be
weakly supported iff for all A E B G such that I(A) = J1 =I ..l, one of the following
conditions holds:
1. There is a pseudo gh-clause in G having a ground instance of the form A : Ji {=
B 1 : /11& .. · &Bn : J.ln such that I F B1 : 111 & .. · &Bn : {In. (This case may
occur if JL is any of T, t,f.
2. (This case may occur only if J-L = T.) There are two pseudo gh-clauses in G
having ground instances of the form
A : t -<= B1 : Jll& ... & Bn : J.ln
A : f {::: D 1 : Pl& .. · & D m : Pm
suell that I F B 1 : J.lI& .. · &Bn : j.ln and I F D 1 : PI & · · · & Dm : Pm.
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Theorem 4 I is a weakly supported model of the pseudo GHP G iff TG(I) = I. 0
The following definition apI)lies only to non pseudo GHPs.
Definition 8 Suppose I is a model of the GHP G. Then I is said to be strongly
supported iff for all A E B a , I(A) = J.l =I ..1 implies that there is a gh-clause in G
having a ground instance of the form
Definition 9 An interpretation I is said to be consistent2 iff for all A E B G , I(A) # T.
Tlleorem 5 Suppose G is a GHP. Then I is a strongly supported model of G iff I is
a consistent fixed-point of Ta. 0
As every GHP is, by definition, also a pseudo GHP, theorem 4 applies to GHPs,
and hence yields a model-theoretic characterization of the fixed-points of Ta is ob-
taineda Strongly supported models were first discussed by Apt, Blair and Walker[3] a
It has been argued, in the context of classical logic programming, by Apt and Blair [2]
that supported ll10dels are important because they yield explanations, based on tIle
program, for why certain atoms are truea
3 Closed Pseudo GHPs
One of the crucial properties of classical logic programming is that if A is true in the
least model M p of a logic program P, then there is a clause in P having a ground
instance of the form A '¢= B1&. aa&Bn such that {B1,. aa, B n } ~ Alp, iae. M p F
B 1 &.. · & B n . Unfortunately, the analog of this, in the setting of GHPs is not truea
Exan1ple 1 The truth value assigned p in the least model of the following GHP G
is T, but there is no (pseudo) gh-clause in P having a ground instance of the form
p : T -¢::: B 1& a •• &Bn such that Ifp(Tc ) F B 1& . .. &Bna
p : t -¢:::
p:f~
Closed GHPs below have the property that the class of weakly supported models
coincides ¥lith the class of strongly supported models.
2Such interpretations were originally called nice interpretations in [6]. We now feel consistent is
more appropriate.
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Definition 10 A (pseudo) GHP is closed iff for every pair C 1 , C2 (we assume that 0 1
and C2 are standardized apart, i.e. the variables are renamed so that 0 1 , O2 share no
common variables) of (pseudo) gh-clauses in P of the form
Al : J-l1 '¢= B{ : pI & & B~ : p~ (1)
A2 : J.l2 ¢:: B;: 'l/Ji& &B~: t/;:n (2)
such that A I , A2 are unifiable via mgu () it is the case that
(AI: U{J-l 1 ,J-l 2 } '¢= B~ : p~ & ... & B~ : p~ &B; : 'l/Ji & ... & B~ : 'l/J?n)B (3)
is a (possibly pseudo) gh-clause of G. The closure of a (psuedo) GHP G, denoted
CL(G), is the closed (possibly pseudo) GHP obtained by repeatedly adding to Gall
clauses C obtained from gh-clauses C1 , C2 whose heads are unifiable.
As we will see below, the (possibly, pseudo) gh-clause (3) above is a logical conse-
quence of gh-clauses (1) and (2). Closing a program G adds certain logical consequences
of G as explicit gh-clauses.
Example 2 Consider the GHP G of the preceding example. Then
CL(G) = G u {p: T ¢=}
Note that even though G is a GHP, CL(G) is a pseudo GHP.
Lemma 1 Suppose G is a (possibly pseudo) GHP, I a weakly supported model of G
and A E BG is such that I(A) = JL #1... Then there is a pseudo gh-clause in C L(G)
having a ground instance of the form
A : /-L {=: B 1 : PI &· .. & Bn : J.ln
such that I F B I : III & . · · & B n : J-ln
Proof. Suppose I(A) = Il =1= 1-, where I is weakly supported. Either condition (1) or
condition (2) in the definition of weakly supported models must hold with respect to
(w.r.t.) A. If condition 1 holds, then the lemma is trivially true; so assume condition
2 holds. Then I(A) = T and there exist pseudo gh-clauses 0 1 , O2 that are variant (cf.
Lloyd[28, p.19]) of gh-clauses in G (standardized apart) where
AI: t ¢= E1 : J-ll& ... &Ek : Ilk
A" : f '¢= D 1 : 'l/Jl& · · ·&Dm : 'l/Jm
such that for some ground instances CIa! and C2 G'2 of C1 , O2 respectively, (where t7i
affects all and only the variable symbols of Ci ), such that I F (E1 : J-ll& · · · &Ek : J-lk)al
and I F (D1 : ¢1& ... &Dm : 'l/Jm)a2. Thus, AI and A" are unifiable (as they have a
common instance A). Let () be the mgu of AI and A". Then the clause C given by
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is a pseudo gh-clause in CL(G). Since A is a common ground instance of A' and A",
and C1 and C2 may without loss of generality be presumed to be standardized apart,
there is a ground instance of C with head A : T whose body is satisfied by I. 0
Tlleorem 6 1. I is a model of the pseudo GHP G iff I is a model of CL(G), i.e.
G and CL(G) are logically equivalent.
2. Moreover, Ta = TCL(G).
Proof. (1) As CL(G) 2 G, every model of CL(G) is a model of G. To show that
every model of G is a model of CL(G), it suffices to show that if I is a model of G,
then I is a model of CL(G) - G. Suppose
A : Jl. -¢= B 1 : Pl& ... &Bk : Pk&D1 : 'l/JI& ... &Dm : 1/;m
is a ground instance of a pseudo gh-clause in CL(G) - G and I F= B 1 : PI & · · . &Bk :
Pk&D 1 : 1/;1& · · · &Dm : 7/;m. The above pseudo gh-clause must have been derived from
two pseudo gh-clauses in G having ground instance of the form
A: J.l2 -¢= D 1 : 1/Jl&· .. &Dm : 'l/Ym
\vllere I-" = U{1-"1,1-"2}. As I is a model of G, and as I satisfies the body of each of
the above two ground pseudo gh-clauses, it must be the case that I F= A : J.lI a.nd
I F= A : j.l2, i.e. I(A) ~ J.ll and I(A) t Jl2, i.e. I(A) ~ U{/lI, 1l2} = J.l. This completes
the proof.
(2) Since G ~ CL(G), it is immediately apparent that Ta :5 TCL(G). Suppose I is
an interpretation and A E Ba is such that TCL(G)(I)(A) = 1-". \Ve need to show that
Ta(I)(A) t Ji.
Gase 1. If J1 = ..L, then TCL(G)(I)(A) ~ TG(I)(A) trivially.
Case 2. If J.l E {t, f}, then there is a pseudo gh-clause in CL(G) which is in G such
that
A: J-l {= B 1 : J.ll&' .. &Bk : J-lk&
and I F= B1 : J.ll& · · . &Bk : Ilk·
Case 3. I-" = T. Then there is a pseudo gh-clause in CL(G) such that
and I F= B 1 : J.ll&·. · &Bk : J-lk&D 1 : PI& ... &Dm : pm. Then there are tvvo pseudo
gh-clauses in G having ground instances of the form
A: t -¢= B 1 : Jil& &Bk : Ilk
A: f -{= D1 : PI& &Dm : pm
8
It follo\vs that TG(I)(A) ~ U{t,f}, i4e4 TG(I)(A) = T.
This completes the proof. o
The above theorem establishes that a pseudo GHP and its closure have the same
declarative meaning, and moreover that they are equivalent in a computational sense
as Ta = TCL(G). The requirement, in the definition of closure of pseudo GHPs, that
tIle pseudo gh-clauses Cl , C2 be standardized apart is necessary for Lemma 1 to hold,
as is evident from the following example.
Example 3 Consider the GHP G below:
p : t ¢:: q(X) : t
p : f {=: r(X) : t
q(a) : t ¢=
r(b):t{=
Now, TG i w(p) = T. If we construct the closure of G without standardizing apart the
first 2 gh-clauses above, then C L(G) would be:
G U {p: T ¢= q(X) & r(X)}
Note that TCL(G) rw(p) = T, but there is no clause in CL(G) of the form
p : T -{=: Bl : III & · · ·& Bn : JLn
such that the weakly supported model TCL(G) i w F= B1 : J11 &. · . & En : ;.Ln. The only
pseudo gh-clause in CL(G) having p : T as the head is the pseudo gh-clause added to
G above, but TCL(G) i w does not satisfy any of the two instances of the body obtained
by instantiating X to a, b respectively. This example shows that pseudo gIl-clauses
must be standardized apart for Lemma 1 to hold.
4 Query Processing Procedure
Defillition 11 A query Q is an existentially closed conjunction of annotated atoms.
In logic programming, the notion of query is usually restricted to that of existential
queries4 We do not claim that this is the only kind of question one may wish to
ask of a database. We observe that given a formula of the form (\:Ix)F where the
variable symbol x has a free occurrence in F, the problem: "Is (Vx)F true in all
Herbrand models of P?" is a rrg-complete problem. There is a strong feeling, both
in logic programming, and to some extent in AI also, (cf4 Shoham [37]), that all tIle
individuals that affect our domain of discourse are known to exist. This appears to
justify the consideration of Herbrand models. As solutions to rrg-complete problems
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are not effectively implementable on a computer, we do not address such queries. As
far as our semantics is concerned, given a ground implication:
where each Ai : Pi is an annotated atom, we can answer such a query (w.r.t. GHP G)
by simply checking, using our SLDgh-procedure described below, whether Ao : fLo is a
logical consequence of the expanded GHP
In order to consider disjunctive queries, we need to use two Inechanisms that are
known to be highly expensive, viz. factoring and ancestry resolution. As GHPs are
intended to yield a viable programming language, one needs to make a trade-off between
efficiency and ease and implementation on one hand, and expressive power on the other.
Therefore \ve do not consider disjunctive queries in this paper.
Definition 12 Suppose Q=(3)(A1 : jtl & ... & An : fLn) is a query and C =
is a pseudo gh-clause such that C and Q are standardized apart and such that for some
Ai, 1 ~ i ~ n and A are unifiable via mgu () and p t fLi. Then the SLDgh-resolvent of
Q and C on Ai is the query
Ai : /li is called the annotated literal resolved upon.
Exanlple 4 Consider the query Q (3X, 17 )(p(X) : t &q(X, 17 ) : f), and the GHP G
below:
(C1) p(a) : t -¢= r(Z) : t
(02) q(a, b) : f <=
(C3) q(a, c) : t {=
TIle SLDgh-resolvent of Q and CIon p(X) : t is
(3Y,Z)(r(Z): t&q(a,Y): f)
TIle SLDgh-resolvent of Q and C2 on q(X, Y) : f is
p(a) : t
There is no SLDgh-resolvent of Q and C3 since t 'i f.
We now show, in the next section that SLDgh-resolution with a slight twist, IS
sound and complete for existential queries to GHPs and pseudo GHPs.
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5 Soundness and Completeness Issues
The main aim of this section is to prove the soundness and completeness of an SLDgh-
resolution based strategy for processing queries to GHPs.
Definition 13 An SLDgh-deduction from the initial query Ql - Al : PI & · · · &An : J-ln
and the GHP (not pseudo GHP !) G is a sequence
where
1. each Ci is a pseudo gh-clause from CL(G) whose variable symbols are renamed so
that Ci contains no variable symbols in common with any Cj, j < i and Q j, j ~ i
2. Qi+l is the SLDgh-resolvent of Qi and Ci and ()i is the mgu used in the SLDgh-
resolution
Definition 14 An SLDgh-refutation of the initial query Ql is a finite sequence
such that the SLDgh-resolvent of Qr and Cr is the empty query.
It is important to note that the (pseudo) gh-clauses used in an SLDgh-deduction
of a query Ql from a GHP G come from the closure of G but not necessarily from G
itself. (This is the "twist" alluded to earlier on in the paper.)
Tlleorem 7 (Soundness) If there exists an SLDgh-refutation of the initial query Ql:
from tIle GHP G ~ then
Proof. Suppose tllere exists an SLDgh-refutation of the initial query Q1 from G of
the following form:
(Q1' C1, 01),.", (Qn, en, On)
We will show by induction on n that TQ i w F Q1.
Base Case: [n == 1] Then the gh-resolvent of Q1 and 0 1 is tIle empty query,i.e. Q1 is a
unit conjunction (i.e. Al : PI) and C1 is a unit pseudo gh-clause,i.e. 0 1 is of the form
A' : f3 -¢:::
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where (3 t Pt and A 181 = A 181 . As TG i w is a model of the GHP G and hence of
CL(G), it must be a model of Cl , and so it must be true that for every ground instance
A2 of AI, Ta i w(A2 ) t (3. In particular, for every A3 that is a ground instance of
AIBl , Ta i w(A3) t (3 t PI, hence Ta i w F Q1.
Induction Case: Suppose
is an SLDgh-refutation of Q1~ Then
is an SLDgh-refutation of Q2~ Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, Ta i w F Ql.
But Q2 is the gh-resolvent of Ql and C1. So Q2 has the form:
where C1 is the pseudo gh-clause
such that H81 = A i81 and 8 t Pi (by definition of gh-resolution). Because Ta i w F Q2
it follows that
Ta i W F (E1 : 'l/;l& ~ · · &Er : V;r )()1
(as this is a sub-conjunct of Q2). As TG i w is a model of G and hence of CL(G),
it must satisfy every pseudo gh-clause of CL(G) (and every renamed version of any
pseudo gh-clause in CL(G)). In particular, TG Tw must satisfy CIBt . TG Tw satisfies
the body of C1(}1, so it must satisfy HOt: 8. But H()t == A i 81 ; so Tc Tw F A i B1 : 8.
Therefore, since 8 t Pi, TG i W F Ai(JI : Pi. Thus,
o
Definition 15 An unrestricted SLDgh-refutation of the query Q1 from the pseudo
GHP G is an SLDgh-refutation of Q1 from G except that the requirement that the (}i'S
be most general unifiers is dropped - the Bi's need only be unifiers.
Lemn'la 2 (Mgu Lemma) Let G be a GHP and Q1 a query. Suppose Q1 has an
unrestricted SLDgh-refutation from G~ Then Q1 has an SLDgh-refutation from G of
the same lengtll. If (}1' ... ,()n are the substitutions from the unrestricted refutation, and
()~, ~ .. ,()~ are the substitutions from the SLDgh-refutation, then there is a substitution
, such that (}t . · ~ (}n = e~··· (J~,.
Proof. By induction on tIle length of the unrestricted refutation.
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Lemma 3 (Lifting Lemma) Suppose G is a GHP, Q1 a query and 0 a substitution.
Suppose there is an SLDgh-refutation of Q1(). Then there is an SLDgh-refutation of
Q1 from G of the same length. Moreover, if ()1' ... ,()n are the mgu's from the SLDgh-
refutation of Ql() and (}~, ... , ()~ are the mgu's from the SLDgh-refutation of Ql, then
there is a substitution I such that OBI · .. {)n = (}~ ... (}~/. 0
Tlleorem 8 (Completeness) Suppose G is any GHP. Then if Q1 - (::J)(A1 : P1& ... &
Am : Pm) is a query that is satisfied by Ta i w, then there is an SLDgh-refutation of
Q1 from G.
Proof. If Ta i w 1== (~)(A1 : Pl& .. . &Am : Pm), then Ta i w F= (AI: Pl& ... &Am :
Pm)8 where () is a substitution that makes Ql() = (AI : PI&··. &Am : Pm) ground.
Thus, there is an integer n such that Ta i n F= (AI: PI&. · ·&Am : Pm)(). The proof
proceeds by induction on n.
Base Case. (n == 1) Then for each AiO : Pi there is a unit gh-clause in CL(G) having
a ground instance Ci such that Ci - AiO : Jl~ (where Jl~ t Pi). CL(G). Figure 2 then
shows an unrestricted SLDgh-refutation path for the query Ql(}. By the I\1gu Lemma,
there then exists an SLDgh-refutation of Ql() from G. By the Lifting Lemma, there is
an SLDgh-refutation of Q1 from G.
Inductive Case. (n + 1) Suppose Ta i (n + 1) F= Q10. Then, for each A i () : Pi, either
1. TG i n F= AiB : Pi in which case, by the inductive hypothesis, there is an SLDgh-
refutation of AiB : Pi from G, or
2. Case (1) does not occur, in which case, there is a gh-clause in CL(G) having a
ground instance of the form
AiB: /-l <= B1 : 'l/J1 &... & B k : 'l/Jk
such that jj t Pi and Ta i n F= B 1 : 1/;1 &... & Bk : 'lfJk. By the induction
hypothesis, the ground query B 1 : ¢l & ... & B k : 'l/Jk has an SLDgh-refutation
?R from G; hence the following diagram (Fig. 3) shows an unrestricted SLDgh-
refutation of AiO : Pi from G. By the Mgu Lemma, there is an SLDgh-refutation
of AiO : Pi from G.
Thus, for each 1 S i ~ m, there is an SLDgh-refutation (from G) ~i of AiB : Pi. These
can be combined into an SLDgh-refutation of Q1B from G (see Fig. 4). By the Lifting
Lemma, it follows that there exists an SLDgh-refutation of Q1 from G. 0
6 Applications of GHPs
In this section, we present two examples that demonstrate the application of GHPs
to the development of very large knowledge bases4 The first develops a small expert
system for real estate investment, while the second is a "murder mystery" .
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Example 5 (Land Investment) The following gh-clauses define a simple GHP for
real estate investment.
buy(X) : t '¢= tourist_resort(X) : t
buy(X) : t '¢= has_oil(X) : t
buy(X) : f -¢= possible_problem(X) : t
possible_problem(X) : t -¢= near_nuclear_plant(X) : t
possible_problem(X) : t ¢ disputed-land(X) : t
tourist_resort(waikiki) : t ¢::
has_oil(el_haciendos) : t ¢
near_nuclear_plant(el_haciendos) : t ¢::
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
The first two gh-clauses say that it is worth buying X if X either is a tourist resort,
or has oiL The third gh-clause advocates caution - "don't buy land at a place where
problems may crop up" . gh-clauses (4) and (5) describe two possible problems, viz.
being near a nuclear plant, and being disputed land. The last three clauses tell us that
waikiki is a tourist resort, and that el_haciendos has oil, but is near a nuclear plant.
This GHP contains illconsistent information because, gh-clauses (2) and (7) yield
buy(el-haciendos) : t, while (3),(4),(8) yield buy(el_haciendos) : f. Nonetheless, not
every sentence is derivable from this GHP, e.g. buy(waikiki) : f is not a logical conse-
quence of this GHP, i.e. TG Tw ~ buy(waikiki) : f. The purpose of this example is to
illustrate two facts:
1. Inconsistencies can easily arise while building expert systems. Each of the rules
contained in this GHP could arise, quite legitimately, while designing an expert
system for land acquisition.
2. The framework of this paper is such that inconsistent information about A does
not affect B, unless B is defined in terms of A. Thus, our framework, in some
sense, localizes the inconsistenc~y, and permits us to continue reasoning safely
\vith B despite the inconsistent information about A being present.
Example 6 (Murder Mystery) This is a simple GHP for identifying suspects in
a murder mystery. As anyone who has read murder mysteries knows, inconsistencies
abound as people lie to protect themselves, and all that is kno\vn is a tangled web of
lies. TIle scenario here is that Al was killed in his room at 10:30 AM. John, Ann, and
Bill made the following statements:
1. John admits to being at AI's room until 10:00 AM. He has no alibi for 10:30 Alv1.
2. Ann claims to have been at home with Bill from 9 AM to 11 AM.
14
3. Bill was with Ann
The physical evidence at the murder site (AI's room) was that:
1. Al was stabbed
2. two sets of fingerprints were found on the murder weapon; John's, with Ann's
superimposed on his ..
3. The neighbours were asleep and didn't see anything
The information here could be summed up as follows:
alibi(X) : T
opportunity(X) : t & motive(X) : t
at(al.:room, Y, Tl) : t &
superimposed_fingerprint(X, Y) : t &
T> Tl
at(ann_house, ann, T) : t ~ 9 < T < 11
at(ann_house,biil,T): t {:= 9 < T < 11
alibi(X) : T {::: lying(X) : t
superimposed_fingerprint(ann,john) : t <=
lying(X) : t {= at(Placel, X, T) : t &
at(Place2, X, T) : t
Placel =1= Place2
suspect(X) : t
suspect(X) : t
motive(ann) : t
motive(john) : t
opportunity(john) : t
at(al_room, john, 10) : t
at(ai_room, X, T) : t
In addition, we assume that clauses defining the < relation are available. The
above program can be used to identify t\VO suspects. John is a suspect because he
had both the motive, and the opportunity (no alibi for 10:30 AM). Ann becomes a
suspect because she is lying (as her fingerprints were superimposed on those of John,
who admitted being in the room at 10:00 A~v1; hence Ann must have been in AI's room
some time after 10:00 AM). Note that as in the case of classical logic programming
[28], the ordering of gh-clauses and the arrangement of literal in the body of a clause
make no difference as far as the model theoretic semantics, fixed point semantics and
existence of refutations are concerned.
The purpose of the above example is to show that our model theory" is robust
enough to allow reasoning in the face of inconsistency (in classical logic) .. Note that
the above GHP possesses models (in the non-classical logic). Of course, a great deal
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of work remains to be done in developing a formal methodology for the construction
of very large logic programs (which may possibly contain erroneous information). The
actual design of such programs is a different issue from that of reasoning about such
programs.
It has been suggested that the Murder mjlstery program can be written in Prolog
itself. This scheme, to our mind is philosophically ill-founded. We have heard of no
system of (first-order) logic in which the truth values can be treated as first-class ob-
jects. Any such attempt must fall within the realm of metalogic - and the semantics
of metalogic programming is not at all well-understood (cf. [20], [39]). Moreover, con-
verting GHPs by adding truth values as arguments to predicate symbols, is essentially
a translational mechanism like those of Morgan [32]. When such translational mecha-
nisms are proposed, formal theoretical relationships between the initial formalism and
its translation need to be carefully studied.
7 Conclusions
Mechanical reasoning in inconsistent formal systems is of vital importance in expert
systems design. This, of course, has been known for some time to both computer
scientists (cf. Perlis[36]) and logicians (notably Newton cia Costa [9,10,11,12] and
Michael Dunn [13]).
To our knowledge, the first attempt at addressing the problem of inconsistencies
in logic programming theory, was that of Fitting [14]; a concurrent effort \vas due to
Blair and Subrahmanian[6,7], as well Subrahmanian [1,38]. Before proceeding to say
any further ~ we emphasize, as we have done in the previous paragraph, that we are not
the first to study the problem of mechanical reasoning in inconsistent formal systems.
This has been done by many individuals in different settings - e.g. Girard [19] and
AvrOll [4] study a s~ystem of relevance logic called linear logic that addresses issues in
concurrent programming. Likewise Patel-Schneider [34,35] addresses the tautological
entailment issue in the context of four-valued terminological logics. The inheritance
net community [45,44] has also studied a relevant-like semantics for inheritance nets.
But it is only recently that a declarative semantics has been proposed for inheritance
nets by I(ifer and llis co-workers [23,24]. Both these works use the setting of annotated
programs introduced in [1,38,6]. Martins and Shapiro [29] develop a theory of non-
monotonic belief revisions based on relevance logic. Their system lacks a simple model
theory. Their implementation, however, is impressive. In logic programming, we are
also concerned with designing a viable programming language, i.e. one that can be
easily implemented. (Note that an extension of the results presented here has been
implemented in an experimental system called QUANTLOG, cf. Subrahmanian and
Umrigar [39]. The truth values of QUANTLOG consist of the reals in the unit interval
[0, 1] together with an additional value T. Tllese truth values are ordered as sho\vn
in Figure 1 below. The special case of tIle QUANTLOG system obtained by allo\ving
annotations to consist only of 0.5, 0, 1, T yields the same logic as the four-valued logic
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Figure 1: Lattice of Truth Values in QUANTLOG
we use in this paper.)
A declarative semantics for GHPs was originally presented in [6]~ Two proof pro-
cedures were presented in [6].
1~ The first proof procedure was based on an AND/0R tree searching technique,
and was proven to be sound for ground queries to a class of GHPs called well-
coveretF ~
2~ The second proof procedure was an SLD-resolution like technique \vhich was
proven to be sound for all existential queries, but completeness was proved only
for ground queries to well-behaved4 GHPs.
Thus, there \\las scope for strengthening the completeness results obtained in [6]~
IN fact, this problem is cited as an open problem at the end of [6]. In tllis paper, vve
have developed a procedure called SLDgh-resolution that is sound and complete for
processing existential queries to arbitrary GHPs. Thus, none of the restrictions (viz.
ground queries, well-coveredness, well-behavedness) are needed in our soundness and
complete11ess results. This is the strongest possible completeness result one can obtain
for the fragment of annotated logics that we are concerned with.
The framework described in this paper does not allow clauses to have disjunctive
heads. Thus, for instance, if we wish to say that "Clyde is either a frog or a squir-
rel, but I am not sure which", we find that we cannot express this as a GHP. In
3 A (psuedo) gh-clause is well-covered iff there are no variables in the body of the (pseudo) gh-clause
that do not occur in the head of that (pseudo) gh-clause. A (pseudo) GHP is well-covered iff each
(pseudo) gh-clause in it is well-covered.
4 A GHP G is well-behaved iff whenever Al : PI and A2 : /12 are the heads of any two gh-clauses in
G such that AI, A 2 are unifiable, it is the case that /11 == J12.
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logic programming too, disjunctions are not allowed to appear in the heads of clauses.
(Note that the clause p +- -'q in logic programming is not operationally equivalent
to (p V q).) This is because resolution systems that are non-I-Iorn require tVJO ex-
pensive tests - factoring and ancestry resolution, for completeness. One of the aims
of logic programming is to provide a viable (easily, and reasonably efficiently imple-
mentable) programming language. One of the trade-offs that have traditionally been
made in programming language development (not just in Prolog) has been to trade-off
expressive power against efficiency gains. In the framework described in this paper,
we have avoided ancestry resolution and factoring in order to gain expressive power.
This is why disjunctions are not allowed to appear in the head of a clause in GHPs.
In addition, many fixed-pointS results collapse for disjunctive programs. A fixed-point
semantics and a proof theory for GHP extended by allowing disjunctions to appear
in clause heads is described in a recent work of Subrahmanian [41]. Unfortunately, in
this extended framework, the relationship between models (resp. supported models)
of a GHP G and the pre-fixed-points (resp. fixed-points) of the Ta operator collapses.
Moreover, ancestry resolution and factoring are required, thus making query process-
ing more inefficient. As a side remark, we emphasize that pure definite clause logic
programs (not GHPs) are computationally expressive enough in the sense that all the
r.e. sets are computable as the success set (cf. Lloyd [28] for a formal definition of suc-
cess set) of a Ibgic program. Thus for computational purposes, Horn clauses seem fine.
(Non-r.e. sets cannot be computed anyway). Thus, there is an additional trade-off to
be made between computational power and expressive power.
7.1 Discussion
The development of a fixed-point semantics for pure logic programs was one of the
central early developments in classical logic programming. These results are clearly and
elegantly described in Lloyd's book [28]. What then, are we to expect of non-classical
logic programs? What semantical properties should these programs have? Is it
reasonable to expect that the models (over a fixed pre-structure, say) be characterizable
in terms of the pre-fixed-points (or fixed-points) of a monotone operator that maps
structures to structures ?
We have no definite answer to the last two questions. OUf inclination, for purely
aesthetic reasons, is to say yes. OUf own research has been, thus far, carried out with
this goal in mind. After all, talking of pre-fixed-points make sense only when the space
of structures is partially ordered. What if no such natural partial ordering exists ?
The other issue surrounding non-classical logics is that of proof tlleory. Do complete
proof procedures exist ? In several cases (e.g. various systems of modal and temporal
logic), the answer is negative. If a program in logic L is a finite set of sentences having
5Fixed-point semantics for programming languages have been studied extensively by Scott et al
[18]. In logic, the best known work linking fixed-point theory and logical consequence is due to Tarski
[42]. Studies of the fixed-point theory associated with relevance and certain kinds of four valued logic
has been conducted by Woodruff[30).
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a certain syntactic form, then an effort must be made to ensure that the set of queries
that are logical consequences of such programs is recursively enumerable. Only then is
the notion of program in logic L a computationally useful one.
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